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Abstract
We present results on simulations of a stock market with heterogeneous, 
cumulative  information  setup.  We  find  a  non-monotonic  behaviour  of 
traders’ returns as a function of their information level. Particularly, the 
average informed agents underperform random traders; only the most in­
formed agents are able to beat the market. We also study the effect of a 
strategy updating mechanism, when traders have the possibility of using 
other pieces of information than the fundamental value. These results cor­
roborate the latter ones: it is only for the most informed player that it is re­
warding to stay fundamentalist.  The simulations reproduce some stylized 
facts of tick-by-tick stock-exchange data and globally show informational 
efficiency.
Motivation: Experiments and computer modeling
In many studies on the role/value of information in markets, including stock markets, 
usually  two  levels  of  information,  such  as  informed  and  uninformed,  are  taken  into 
account  (Grossman  and  Stiglitz  1980,  Hellwig  1982,  Figliewski  1982,  Sunder  1992, 
Scalas et  al.  2005). In this case, more knowledge is always better  then less. In other 
words,  insiders  are  able  to  outperform  uninformed  investors.  However,  interesting 
behaviour may emerge if one takes into account the interaction of more than two persons 
with heterogeneous information levels.  There is a physical analogy when considering 
two-body  systems  versus  many-body  systems.  Many-body  systems  display  complex 
behaviour such as chaotic sensitivity to initial conditions. Many heterogeneous agents in 
a stock market may interact both directly, by direct communication, and indirectly, via 
the market mechanism. In this paper, we model a set of experiments where more than two 
agents endowed with heterogeneous information trade a single risky asset using a double 
auction mechanism and do not communicate among each other. The agents can choose 
between the risky asset paying a random dividend and cash for which a fixed interest rate 
is paid at the end of each trading period.
Experiments based on the previous-mentioned ideas were carried out by Jürgen Huber 
and Michael Kirchler at the University of Innsbruck. In particular, we focused on the 
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2004 session with the participation of business students* (Huber et al. 2006, Kirchler and 
Huber 2007). These experiments were based on a cumulative information system: More 
informed  agents  had  additional  information  compared  to  less  informed  agents. 
Information was defined by  the  forecasting  horizon of  future dividends (which were 
generated before the trading session)**. Nine traders with different forecasting abilities 
were trading in a continuous double auction with limit  orders and market orders.  As 
mentioned above, at the end of each period, a risk free interest rate was paid on the cash 
held by the traders and dividends were paid based on the shares owned, with parameters 
set so that one period corresponds to one month in real market.
The  market  and  information  setup  leads  to  the  following  educated  guess  on  the 
performance of traders as a function of information: Since the model can be understood 
as  a  zero  sum game  compared  to  the  market  return,  we  certainly  know,  that  if  an 
uninformed (random) trader earns the market average return, then either all traders get 
exactly the market return or, if the less informed agent approximately gets the market 
return,  performance  will  be  a  non  monotonic  function  of  the  information  level 
(Schredelseker 1984).
The experiments gave interesting results (Huber 2006, Huber et al. 2006). The net return 
of traders compared to the market return as a function of the information level does not 
show a  monotonic  growth  with  increasing  information.  Traders  having  the  first  five 
levels of information do not outperform the average and only the best-informed traders 
(insiders) were able to get excess return. 
The authors also analyzed some well-known empirical facts (the so-called stylized facts) 
of real world markets. The probability density function of price changes, the decay of the 
autocorrelation function of price changes and the decay of the autocorrelation function of 
absolute price changes were studied. A further study on durations was also performed.  
In all the cases, the experimental market was able to reproduce the stylized facts: the 
distribution  of  returns  was fat  tailed,  the  autocorrelation  of  returns  decayed fast,  the 
autocorrelation  of  absolute  returns  decayed  slowly  (volatility  clustering),  and  the 
durations  were not  exponentially  distributed.  (Kirchler  and Huber  2007,  Scalas et  al. 
2006).
The simulations
The market
In our simulation, we programmed an essential double auction trading mechanism as it 
appears on most of real world financial  markets, with a book containing bid and ask 
orders. As, contrary to real world experiments, in a numerical simulation one has the 
possibility to implement  truly random traders,  we simulated ten agents with different 
levels  of  information  going  from zero  (random traders),  I0 to  nine  I9,  and  with  the 
possibility  of  using  different  trading  strategies  as  will  be  discussed  in  details in  the 
following subsections. As in the experiments, these levels coincided with the forecasting 
horizon of each trader. 
*  The experiments and their results are described in details in other papers of the present book.
** The market mechanism and the information setup will be described in details later in the section The 
simulations.
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In order to be able to estimate the statistical error in our results, we carried out 10000 
runs in each simulation (100 sessions of 100 runs).
The market contained a risky asset (stock) and a risk free bond (cash). Before beginning 
the simulation an information level was assigned to each of the ten agents (nine informed 
and one uninformed), thus having one agent for every level. Initially all the agents were 
given 1600 units  of  cash and 40 shares of  stock with initial  value of  40 units  each. 
Trading consisted of 30 periods each lasting 100 simulation steps. At the beginning of 
each period new information was delivered to the agents according to their information 
level.
At the end of each period a risk free interest rate was paid on the cash held by the agents, 
dividends were paid on the shares  held by the agents (the risk free interest  rate was 
rf=0.01,  the  risk adjusted interest  rate  re=0.005*)  and the  book was cleared.  We also 
carried out simulations without clearing the book and found that the clearing process does 
not make much difference in the results.
The dividend process (being the source of future information) was determined before the 
beginning of trading, being a random walk of Gaussian steps:
 ( ) ( 1) 0.1 (0,1)D i D i N= − + ,
with D(0)=0.2, where N(0,1) is a normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance (in 
case of D(i)<0, we took |D(i)|). We carry out finite time simulations, so that short trends 
in the random walk can have important effects on the dividend process and by that on the 
information  structure  and  the  price  formation  on  the  market.  When  studying  the 
performance of heterogeneously informed agents, we used different dividend processes. 
The results shown are the statistics of 100 simulation sessions, each being run with a 
different random dividend process. One session consists of 100 independent simulation 
runs carried out with the same dividend process.
Information
In order to value shares, traders on the market got information about future dividends. 
The idea of Hellwig 1982 was extended to ten information levels:  different levels of 
information correspond to different lengths of windows in which one can predict future 
dividends. Trader I0 is completely uninformed and put orders at random, trader I1 knows 
the dividend at the end of the current period, trader I2 knows the dividends at the current 
and the next period, and so on up to trader  I9 knowing the current and the next eight 
period dividends (Huber 2006, Huber et  al.  2006).  In this way, we got a  cumulative 
information structure of the market where better-informed agents know future dividends 
earlier than less informed ones. Since market trading consists of several periods (new 
information entering the market  in  each),  the design implies that information trickles 
down through the market from the more informed to the less informed over time.
The information obtained by traders is the present value of the stock conditioned on the 
forecasting horizon (E(V|Ij,k)). This is calculated using Gordon's formula, discounting the 
known  dividends  and  assuming  the  last  one  as  an  infinite  stream,  which  is  also 
* In the paper Tóth et al. 2007 the risk adjusted interest rate was erroneously given as re=0.05.
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discounted. E(V|Ij,k) stands for the conditional present value of the asset in period k for 
the trader with information level j (Ij).
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where re is the risk adjusted interest rate (E(-- | --) denotes the conditional average).
Before the beginning of the experiment, an information level was randomly assigned to 
each agent. There was one trader for each information level. At the beginning of each 
period  new  information  was  delivered  to  the  agents  depending  on  their  level  of 
information.
Summarizing, as often mentioned, overall we implemented ten levels of information, a 
completely  uninformed  trader  (random  trader),  I0 and  nine  informed  traders  with 
different  levels  of  information  from  I1 to  I9,  where  agent  Ij has  information  of  the 
dividends for the end of the current period and of (j-1) forthcoming periods (forecasting 
ability).
Trading strategies
At the beginning of each period, agents submit orders according to their idea of the value 
of stocks. After that, during the period, in every time step, a trader is randomly chosen, 
who either accepts a limit order from the book (puts a market order) or puts a new limit 
order to the book.
Since we do not exactly know how traders use their information in the real world and in 
the  experiments,  we  gave  the  possibility  to  simulated  traders  to  strictly  apply  the 
fundamental  information  they  get  (fundamentalists),  not  to  take  any  information  in 
account except the current price and trade randomly (random traders) or to look at other 
pieces of information such as trends (chartists). In this section we describe the different 
strategies in short. The Mat Lab® codes for these strategies can be found in Appendix A, 
as well as on the web page: http://www.phy.bme.hu/~bence.
Fundamentalists
Fundamentalist traders strictly believe in the information they receive. If they find an ask 
order with a price lower or a bid order with a price higher than their estimated present 
value,  i.e.  E(V|Ij,k),  they accept  the limit  order,  otherwise they put  a new limit  order 
between the former best bid and best ask prices.
Random traders
Random traders randomly send orders to the market based on the price of the last trade 
(current price). With probability 0.5 they put an ask (bid) order slightly higher (lower) 
than the current price.
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Chartists
Chartist  traders  are  searching  for  trends  in  the  price  movements.  In  case  of  three 
consecutive upward (downward) price steps they buy (sell), otherwise they give a new 
order to the limit order book.
 
Results
In our simulations we considered the effect of information on the performance of agents 
throughout the market session and we studied the returns of different traders as a function 
of  the information level.  We also analysed the results  from the point  of view of the 
Efficient  Market  Hypothesis  and we qualitatively  checked the  stylized  facts  of  stock 
markets. As already mentioned, in order to reduce statistical errors we carried out 10000 
runs of the simulation. Finally, when thinking about real world situations, one has to take 
into  account  some kind  of  learning/adaptation  process  for  the  traders  (Schredelseker 
2001). To mimic this effect, we also studied the situation when agents can periodically 
compare their performance to the market average and change their trading strategies if 
they find themselves under the average.
Final wealth as a function of information
The final return of each agent relative to the market return can be seen in Figure 1, the 
results are the average of 100 sessions, each session consisting of 100 runs. These results 
are in good qualitative agreement with the experimental results presented elsewhere in 
this  book: we  get  a  curve  that  we  call  J-curve.  Agents  with  an  average  level  of 
information (I1-I5) perform worse than the completely uninformed random agent (I0). 
The most informed agents outperform the market. To test the hypothesis of the J-curve 
we ran the Wilcoxon rank sum test for equal medians (Gibbons 1985, Hollander and 
Wolfe 1973), on the relative return for pairs of information levels. The p-values of the 
tests  can  be  found  in  Table  1.  One  can  see  that  the  hypothesis  of  two  returns 
corresponding to different agents being drawn from the same distribution can be excluded 
in almost all cases at the 0.05 significance level. This result and its relevance for real 
markets will be discussed further in the section Conclusions.
I0 I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 I8
I1 0.000*
I2 0.000* 0.932
I3 0.000* 0.507 0.385
I4 0.000* 0.003* 0.002* 0.013*
I5 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
I6 0.144 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
I7 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
I8 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.009*
5
I9 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.001* 0.057**
Table 1 p-values of the Wilcoxon rank sum test for equal medians on differences in 
performance between the information levels.
* significant at the \(0.05\) level
** significant at the \(0.1\) level
In order to understand why the random trader gets almost exactly the market return and to 
see how the relative wealth of agents looks like in simpler cases, we ran simulations with 
only three agents in the market (the standard deviation of dividends being 0.01, rf=0.001 
and re=0.005 in  this  case):  an uninformed (I0),  an average  informed (I4)  and a  well 
informed (I9).
Figure 2 shows the same plot of  Figure 1 for these simulations with only three agents. 
Again, we can exclude the monotonicity of the curve and even if with three points it is 
harder to call it a J-curve, we can see that the random trader performs better than the 
average informed one and only the well-informed agent gets excess returns. In this case 
also  the  performance  of  the  random  trader  is  below  the  market  level,  giving  an 
explanation based on price impact for the question raised: when enough actors are present 
on the market, the price impact of the random trader becomes negligible, thus the random 
trader has equal probability of being beaten by the market and of beating the market. 
In  order  to  gain  more  insight  into  the  process,  in  Table  2 we  show  the  relative 
performance of the random trader in the case of different number of agents (when the 
least informed agents are always present on market).
number of traders 3 5 7 9 10
relative performance 
of random trader [%]
-2.7 -1.0 -0.2 +0.2 -0.1
Table  2 Relative  performance  of  the  random  trader  on  markets  with  different 
number of agents. Note that in this case the least informed agents are always present 
on the market (e.g. in case of 3 traders: I0, I1 and I2). As more agents are present on 
the market, the performance of the random agent approaches 0 (the market return).
The Efficient Market Hypothesis
Efficiency has various meanings in economics. One can talk about productive efficiency, 
Pareto efficiency or informational efficiency (Tesfatsion 2006). When we write the term 
efficiency,  we mean informational efficiency: A market  is  efficient  if  all  information 
available is built into the asset prices at each time instance. In other words, the price of an 
asset reflects all available relevant information. Thus a market containing risky financial 
assets is efficient in a time period if the traders exploit all profit opportunities, with no 
further profit to be achieved. In case of risk-neutral traders, for a market containing a 
risk-free  asset,  this  leads  to  the  following  sub-martingale  condition:  the  conditional 
expected return on the risky asset must be equal to the return rate of the risk free asset. 
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Let the return rate on the risk-free asset in the period [t,t+1) be denoted by rf(t,t+1), and 
rA(t,t+1)  be  the  return  for  the  risky  asset  A in  the  same  period.  Let  us  denote  the 
information available to the traders at time t by I(t). Then the efficient market hypothesis 
can be written in the following way:
[ ]( , 1) | ( ) ( , 1),         t=0,1,2,...A fE r t t I t r t t+ = +
Where, as above, E(-- | --) denotes the conditional expectation.
We tested our simulations from the point of view of efficiency as described above. In our 
case, the risk adjusted interest rate, which we used for discounting future dividends was 
set to re=0.005. The histogram of the net simple returns on the asset is presented in Figure
3. One can see that the average of net simple returns in the simulations is 0.0049, very 
close to the adjusted interest rate. Thus, we can state that the simulated market globally 
shows informational efficiency.
Stylized facts
A tool for corroborating the relevance of results in artificial markets is analysing whether 
the empirical stylized facts of markets (Cont 2001) are present. While not getting stylized 
facts in a simulation can falsify the assumptions made, the presence of these facts does 
not confirm the hypotheses as well as other results of the simulation.
We considered three common empirical  stylized facts  as in Kirchler and Huber 2007 
since  the  synchronous  time  structure  of  our  simulation  is  unrealistic  (Daniel  2006, 
Muchnik et al. 2006). Figure 4 shows the autocorrelation functions of returns (circles and 
lines) and of absolute returns (dots and lines). The noise level of the computations is also 
included  in  the  plot  (straight  lines).  One  can  see  that  the  autocorrelation  of  returns 
immediately decays under the noise level (with a negative overshoot for small lags as 
usual  for  high frequency data  in  real  world markets  too -  in  real  world markets  the 
negative  overshoot  is  explained  by  market  friction  due  to  fees,  here  it  is  a  likely 
consequence  of  the  unrealistic  time  structure),  thus  there  are  no  long  range  time 
correlation in signed returns. On the other hand, the autocorrelation of absolute returns 
slowly decays showing that price fluctuations tend to cluster (volatility clustering). (A 
slight even-odd oscillation is visible in the autocorrelation of absolute returns; this is an 
artifact  of  our  simulation  process,  as  in  many  cases,  the  inter-trade  duration  is  two 
simulation steps, resulting in this oscillation.)
For comparison, in  Table 3 we have reported the first four moments of the log-return 
distribution for tick-by-tick General Electric (GE) prices in October 1999 (55559 data 
points). In Figure 5, for these data, the autocorrelation of signed and absolute log-returns 
is  plotted as  in  Figure  4.  In  Table 3 it  can be  seen  that  the distribution  function  of 
absolute returns in the simulation is leptokurtic, similarly to real world data, even if the 
kurtosis  is  lower.  Running  the  Jarque-Bera  test,  for  goodness-of-fit  to  a  normal 
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distribution (Judge et al. 1988), we can rule out the normality of the distribution of the 
absolute returns for both cases.
GE data simulation
mean 2.1215e-06 3.5221e-05
standard deviation 4.0078e-04 0.0250
skewness -0.0698 0.1233
kurtosis 36.2677 7.9541
Table  3 The first four moments of the logarithmic return distribution for tick-by-
tick General Electric (GE) prices and for the simulated prices.
The Markov chain for switching strategies
In real life situations, one cannot expect that a trader who is performing under the market 
average for an extended period,  to stick to his/her trading strategy. There are several 
possibilities for a trader to revise his/her strategy. He/she can try looking at other pieces 
of information, changing the stocks he/she is investing in or moving to other sectors in 
which he/she is interested in, etc.; we tried to mimic this freedom and we implemented a 
strategy updating method: Periodically all traders look around and compare their return in 
a certain time interval to the return of the market index in the same interval. If they find 
that they performed under the market they change strategy: If they were fundamentalists 
they switch to chartist, if they were chartists they switch to fundamentalist.
An interesting question is, whether there exists a stable set of strategies depending on the 
fundamental  information  level  (information  which  is  only  used  while  acting  as  a 
fundamentalist, but we continue labeling traders according to this level).
We have run extended simulations searching for a stationary distribution in the case of 
three and five agents corresponding to the levels I1 – I3 and I1 – I5, respectively.
When searching for a stationary distribution, we use notions from Markov chain theory 
and Monte Carlo sampling. Each agent in each period can be either a fundamentalist or a 
chartist,  defining  the  states  of  the  system  between  which  there  are  transitions.  The 
strategy space in our system has 2n states, where n denotes the number of agents.
The 2n x 2n transition matrix between the states is defined as:
number of transitions (A B)( , )
number of occurences (A)
A B ⇒=T ,
where A, B are states of the system. Note that since agents compare their performance to 
the market average, the diagonal and anti-diagonal elements of the transition matrix are 
zero by definition. The frequency of states is denoted by the vector π, defined by:
( (1),..., (2 ))npi pi=π ,
with
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number of occurences (A)( )
total number of occurences
Api = ,
so that ( ) 1
A
Api =∑ . 
A distribution of frequencies is stationary if 
=πT π ,
where π denotes the transpose of π.
3 traders
In the case of three traders, the system has eight possible states. We ran simulations for 
100000 periods with strategy updating at the end of every period. We studied the system 
with all the eight possible initial  conditions (the codes for the states can be found in 
Appendix B).  Figure 6 shows the mean of the frequencies of states over all possible 
initial states, with the standard deviations shown in the error bars. We find that regardless 
of the initial state of the system, the frequencies are approximately the same.
As  one  can  see,  there  are  two  states  (in  other  words  one  state  pair)  with  higher 
frequencies, while the remaining six states appear with much smaller and almost equal 
frequency.  Table 4 shows the transition frequencies between the states of the system. 
From the transition matrix we can see that the transition frequencies between states 2 and 
3 and vice versa are higher, thus justifying the notion of “state pair”. Taking a closer look 
at the most probable states we can see that they correspond to the setups: I1=C, I2=F, 
I3=F (state 2) and I1=F, I2=C, I3=F (state 3). (Where F stands for fundamentalist,  C 
stands for chartist). In both cases the most informed trader (I3) remains fundamentalist 
(thus for him/her it is always worth using his/her information), while the less informed 
traders  bounce  between  the  two  possible  strategies.  This  result  points  to  the  same 
direction as the results discussed above: It is only for the most informed trader that it is 
worth using his/her information.
state 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 0±0 0.146±
0.0042
0.134±
0.0047
0.255±
0.0073
0.169±
0.0040
0.149±
0.0047
0.144±
0.0063
0±0
2 0.037±
0.0020
0±0 0.816±
0.0063
0.031±
0.0013
0.038±
0.0022
0.045±
0.0018
0±0 0.032±
0.0010
3 0.034±
0.0019
0.824±
0.0052
0±0 0.030±
0.0015
0.030±
0.0007
0±0 0.042±
0.0017
0.037±
0.0017
4 0.037±
0.0017
0.145±
0.0041
0.132±
0.0069
0±0 0±0 0.119±
0.0040
0.134±
0.0058
0.207±
0.0140
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5 0.205±
0.0090
0.162±
0.0085
0.139±
0.0060
0±0 0±0 0.145±
0.0042
0.145±
0.0039
0.200±
0.0039
6 0.153±
0.0053
0.193±
0.0066
0±0 0.140±
0.0056
0.144±
0.0038
0±0 0.219±
0.0066
0.149±
0.0024
7 0.142±
0.0036
0±0 0.188±
0.0095
0.151±
0.0057
0.143±
0.0059
0.213±
0.0074
0±0 0.160±
0.0045
8 0±0 0.127±
0.0080
0.130±
0.0054
0.287±
0.0132
0.170±
0.0078
0.139±
0.0034
0.143±
0.0053
0±0
Table  4 The transition matrix between states in case of three traders. We can see 
that the transition frequencies between states 2 and 3 and vice versa are higher, 
justifying the notion of “state pair”. The diagonal and anti-diagonal elements of the 
matrix are zero by definition.
Checking for the stationarity of the frequency distribution of states, we study the relation 
πT=π.  Table 5 shows the average of the state frequencies compared to those multiplied 
by the transition matrix.  Though the numbers are  close to each other,  there is  still  a 
deviation.
state πt Tπt
1 0.095 0.085
2 0.221 0.253
3 0.219 0.248
4 0.095 0.093
5 0.087 0.074
6 0.090 0.081
7 0.091 0.082
8 0.098 0.080
Table  5 The  vector  of  average  frequencies  of  states  and  the  results  for  the 
frequencies  multiplied  by  the  transition  matrix.  We  still  find  deviations  from 
stationarity.
5 traders
In the case of five traders, the system has thirty-two possible states. We ran simulations 
for 600000 periods with strategy updating again at the end of every period. We studied 
the system with all the possible initial states (the codes for the states can be found in 
Appendix B). Figure 7 shows the mean of the frequencies of states for all possible initial 
states, with the standard deviations in the error bars. 
In this case, having 32 possible states, we face numerical difficulties in properly sampling 
the strategy space and deriving a stationary distribution of frequencies, provided it exists. 
This can be seen from Figure 7, where the frequencies of respective states are similar, no 
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matter the initial state; however the error bars are too large and it is impossible to check 
whether the frequency distribution is stationary.
Despite the noisy results, one can see that the most probable states (I1=C, I2=C, I3=F, 
I4=F, I5=F (state 4), I1=C, I2=F, I3=C, I4=F, I5=F (state 6), I1=F, I2=C, I3=C, I4=F, 
I5=F (state 7) and I1=C, I2=F, I3=F, I4=C, I5=F (state10), I1=F, I2=C, I3=F I4=C, I5=F 
(state 11) and I1=F, I2=F, I3=C, I4=C, I5=F (state13)) correspond to three state pairs 
with close frequencies (state4 – state13, state6 – state11, state7 – state10). In all these 
cases the most informed trader remains fundamentalist whereas the less informed traders 
bounce between the possible strategies similarly to the case of three traders. Once again 
this result supports the results shown above: It is only for the most informed trader that it 
is it worth using his/her information.
Conclusions
The results of the simulations presented in our paper show a non-trivial, non-monotonic 
dependence  of  agents’  returns  on  their  amount  of  information,  confirming  results 
obtained in experiments (Huber et al. 2006, Kirchler and Huber 2007). We found, that 
average informed traders perform worse than the market level.  In the simulations we 
analysed the case of uninformed traders and found that if there are enough traders present 
on the market, the uninformed, random trader is able to get the market return. Hence, we 
can state that average informed traders perform worse than the completely uninformed; 
thus in case of the average informed traders the information has a negative effect on the 
performance. Only the most informed traders (insiders) are able to gain above–average 
returns.
We analysed the return of traders in the simulations and found that the markets  market 
globally shows informational efficiency.
In the second part of the paper we implemented a strategy updating method for traders: 
Periodically all traders compare their return in a certain time interval to the return of the 
market index in the same interval. If they find that they performed under the market they 
switch strategy, from fundamentalist to chartist and vice versa. We tested the equilibrium 
frequencies of states in the case of three and five traders, finding a set of most probable 
state pairs between which the system often bounces. These most probable states support 
the following idea on the value of information: only the most informed trader remains 
fundamentalist, the others switch between the strategies very often.
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Appendix A
Below we present the MatLab® codes included in our simulation for the order putting 
mechanism for each of the strategies. The following notations are used in the codes:  p 
stands for the price of the stock in the last transaction; PV stands for the Present Value: 
fundamental value of stocks conditioned on agent's information.
Random traders
if type_of_trader(trader) == 0   % random trader
rrr = rand(1);
if(rrr < .5)
ask = p + 2*randn(1);
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if(ask < bestbid)
operation(trader) = -1;      %sell
else
operation(trader) = 0;
                                
if(ask > 0)
a = [a; trader ask];
bestask = min(a(:,2));
                                
end
end
else
bid = p + 2*randn(1);
if(bid > bestask)
operation(trader) = 1;      % buy
else
operation(trader) = 0;
if(bid > 0)
                                    
b=[b; trader bid];
bestbid=max(b(:,2));
                                
end
end
end
Fundamentalist traders
elseif (type_of_trader(trader) == 1)   % fundamentalist
if(PV(trader) < bestbid)
operation(trader) = -1;          %sell
ask = PV(trader);
elseif(PV(trader) > bestask)
operation(trader) = 1;           %buy
bid = PV(trader);
14
else
operation(trader) = 0;          % new bid/ask order
distance_from_bestask = bestask - PV(trader);
distance_from_bestbid = PV(trader) - bestbid;
if distance_from_bestask > distance_from_bestbid
ask = PV(trader) + (.5 * .5 * randn(1) * (PV(trader) - bestbid));
                                
if (ask > 0)
a = [a; trader ask];
bestask = min(a(:,2));
                                
end
else
bid = PV(trader) + (.5 * .5 * randn(1) * (bestask-PV(trader)));
if (bid > 0)
                                    
b=[b; trader bid];
bestbid=max(b(:,2));
                                
end
end
end
Chartist traders
elseif type_of_trader(trader) == 2   % chartist
if(time > 4 & (P(time,1) < P(time-1,1) & P(time-1,1) < P(time-2,1) & 
P(time-2,1) < P(time-3,1)))  % downward trend in prices
operation(trader) = -1;          %sell
ask = P(time,1) - abs(randn(1));   % ask for lower price
elseif(time > 4 & (P(time,1) > P(time-1,1) & P(time-1,1) > P(time-2,1) 
& P(time-2,1) > P(time-3,1)))     % upward trend in prices
operation(trader) = 1;           %buy
bid = P(time,1) + abs(randn(1));    % offer higher price
elseif(time<4)  % random bid/ask
rd = rand(1);
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if(rd<.5)
operation(trader) = -1;          %sell
ask = p - abs(randn(1));
else
operation(trader) = 1;           %buy
bid = p + abs(randn(1));
end
else                                            % no trend
operation(trader) = 0;          % new bid/ask is given as in case of 
the fundamentalists with PV(trader) = p;
distance_from_bestask = bestask - p;
distance_from_bestbid = p - bestbid;
if distance_from_bestask > distance_from_bestbid
ask = p + (.5 * .5 * randn(1) * (p - bestbid));
                                
if(ask > 0)
a = [a; trader ask];
bestask = min(a(:,2));
                                
end
else
bid = p + (.5 * .5 * randn(1) * (bestask-p));
if(bid > 0)
                                    
b=[b; trader bid];
bestbid=max(b(:,2));
                                
end
end
end
Appendix B
Here we list the codes for the strategies used in throughout the paper. In the tables F 
denotes fundamentalist and C denotes chartist.
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3 traders
strategy 
code
I1’s 
strategy
I2’s 
strategy
I3’s 
strategy
1 F F F
2 C F F
3 F C F
4 C C F
5 F F C
6 C F C
7 F C C
8 C C C
5 traders
strategy 
code
I1’s 
strategy
I2’s 
strategy
I3’s 
strategy
I4’s 
strategy
I5’s 
strategy
1 F F F F F
2 C F F F F
3 F C F F F
4 C C F F F
5 F F C F F
6 C F C F F
7 F C C F F
8 C C C F F
9 F F F C F
10 C F F C F
11 F C F C F
12 C C F C F
13 F F C C F
14 C F C C F
15 F C C C F
16 C C C C F
17 F F F F C
18 C F F F C
19 F C F F C
20 C C F F C
21 F F C F C
22 C F C F C
23 F C C F C
24 C C C F C
25 F F F C C
26 C F F C C
27 F C F C C
28 C C F C C
29 F F C C C
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30 C F C C C
31 F C C C C
32 C C C C C
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Figure 1  Results of simulations (average of 10000 runs). Returns of traders relative 
to  the market  in  percentage,  as  a  function of  information.  One can see that  an 
average level of information is not necessarily an advantage.
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Figure 2  Results of simulations (average of 100 runs). Returns of traders relative to 
the market in percentage, as a function of information. Already, in case of 3 agents 
one can identify a J shaped curve.
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Figure 3 The histogram of net simple returns in one session of the simulation. The 
conditional average of the returns is 0.0049, very near to rf=0.005. Thus we can state 
that our market globally shows informational efficiency.
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Figure  4 Autocorrelation  functions  of  returns  (circles  and  lines)  and  absolute 
returns (dots and lines) and the noise level (solid lines). Autocorrelation of returns 
decays fast under the noise level while autocorrelation of absolute returns decays 
very slowly, showing the clustering of volatility. Results of one separate run of the 
simulations.
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Figure  5 Autocorrelation  functions  of  returns  (circles  and  lines)  and  absolute 
returns (dots and lines) and the noise level (solid lines) for the logarithmic returns of 
General Electric. Autocorrelation of returns decays much faster than that of the 
absolute returns, in agreement with the simulation results.
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Figure  6 The frequencies of states in case of three traders. The average over all 
possible initial states can be seen with the standard deviations as error bars. One 
can see that no matter what initial condition we start from, the frequencies of states 
are more or less the same. The most frequent states correspond to I1=C, I2=F, I3=F 
(state 2) and I1=F, I2=C, I3=F (state 3). (F=fundamentalist, C=chartist).
24
Figure  7 The frequencies  of  states  in  case  of  five  traders.  The average over  all 
possible initial states can be seen with the standard deviations as error bars. It can 
be seen that most of the states appear with low frequency regardless of the initial 
state. The most frequent states correspond to I1=C, I2=C, I3=F, I4=F, I5=F (state 4), 
I1=C, I2=F, I3=C, I4=F, I5=F (state 6), I1=F, I2=C, I3=C, I4=F, I5=F (state 7) and 
I1=C, I2=F, I3=F, I4=C, I5=F (state10), I1=F, I2=C, I3=F I4=C, I5=F (state 11) and 
I1=F, I2=F, I3=C, I4=C, I5=F (state13). (F=fundamentalist, C=chartist).
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